Latin America
Overview
Introduction
Latin America held a unique position in the Cold War, because of the geographical and cultural importance of the region to the United States. Many Latin American states struggled by allying themselves to the United States during this period. To understand the period, it is important to recognize the political powers of populism and military dictatorships that would come to dominate the period and region. As a way to understand the challenges of Latin America, an example of the period would be Argentina.
Learning Objectives
- Evaluate the role of the Cold War on the relationship of Latin America.
- Analyze the impact of the Cold War on Latin American society.
Latin America Following World War II
Latin America struggled throughout the Cold War period, mostly because of the issues of political proximity and relationship to the United States. As the United States saw the expansion of the Soviet Union in Europe and Asia as proximity, so too did the United States see Latin America as fertile grounds to expand their goals and agendas of capitalism.
To understand the period, it is important to recognize the political powers of populism and military dictatorships, that because of political corruption would yield to democracies by the 1990s. that would come to dominate the period and region. As a way to understand the challenges of Latin America, an example of the period would be Argentina.
Argentina After World War II: From Peronism to Dictatorship
Argentina following the Great Depression struggled throughout the Infamous Decade of the 1930s. The country saw a radical rise in political instability and economic conditions worsened. The majority of the goods produced in Argentina’s farms struggled to find a market in Europe or the United States. This would compound the political instability due to the limitations of economics and the spread radicalism. In 1943, a military dictatorship replaced a struggling democracy. By 1945, things began to change in Argentina.
Learning Objectives
- Evaluate Peronism's affects on Argentin in the 20th century
- Analyze the importance of the Dirty War on Argentina.
Key Terms / Key Concepts
disappeared: a person who is secretly abducted or imprisoned by a state or political organization, or by a third party with the authorization, support, or acquiescence of a state or political organization, especially if there is a refusal to acknowledge the person’s fate or whereabouts, which essentially places the victim outside the protection of the law
hyperinflation: in economics, when a country experiences very high and accelerating rates of inflation, which erodes the real value of local currency and causes the population to minimize their holdings of said money
military junta: an oligarchic form of government that differs from a civilian dictatorship in a number of ways, including motivations for seizing power, the institutions through which rule is organized, and the ways in which leaders leave positions of power (Many military juntas have viewed themselves as saving the nation from corrupt or myopic civilian politicians. Military leaders often rule as a junta, selecting one as the head.)
Peronism: also called Justicialism, an Argentine political movement based on the political legacy of former President Juan Domingo Peron and his second wife, Eva Peron
Peronism
The Argentinian political movement Peronism is based on three main principles: social justice, economic independence, and political sovereignty. Developed by Juan Domingo Perón in the 1940s, this political ideology was built on points of populism as a political movement. Populism is a political style where the leadership builds a coalition of ordinary people that feel their concerns are disregarded by established elite groups. This style of leadership usually is led by charismatic leaders that attempt to build coalitions of populations by showing how the ordinary people are left behind and abandoned by the political establishment.
Perón rose to power by harnessing the tensions inside of Argentina in the middle of the 1940s. Perón first rose to power as part of the military dictatorship of the 1943 rebellion. He could have had any position of power, but instead chose to be the secretary of unions because he understood the tensions that the everyday people felt. Perón built a political coalition that followed him based on the industrialization of Argentina during World War II. Many inside of Argentina had Italian and German heritage, and this would provide a unique blend of politics inside the country during World War II. Argentina would be the last country in the Americas to join the Allied forces because of the allegiance to Italy and Germany from ex-patriotic families. Perón used this tension to great effect domestically by painting the United States as an empire and his position of Peronism as a justified removal of the United States from Argentine politics.
Peronism, or Justicialism, is an Argentine political movement based on the political legacy of former President Juan Domingo Peron and his second wife, Eva Peron. The Justicialist Party derives its name from the concept of social justice. In 1945 Perón won the presidential election of Argentina by building a case of social justice and having one of the most famous radio actresses of Argentina as his significant other. The use of radio and mass media were key to Perón’s success and a way to incorporate his movement inside of Argentina. Radio programs, books, and newspaper articles were created to support the supremacy of Peronism and to stop political opposition. After winning the presidency, Perón would go on to take over radio stations and newspaper organizations in Argentina. This was a way to remove freedom of the press. By removing political opposition’s ability to speak about problems facing Argentina, Perón would come to dominate the country throughout the late 1940s into the early 1950s.
One of the key problems that historians have with Peronism is that from the outside, it appears like a dictatorship or authoritarianism. Part of Perón’s success was not from domestic challenges, but instead from a serendipitous moment of post-war economics. Throughout World War II, Argentina supplied war materials, such as wheat and spam, to England. After the war ended, England had a massive debt to Argentina for the years of support. Therefore, when England began to repay Argentina in the late 1940s it caused an economic boom period for the country. Perón was at the right place at the right time because many of his policies of economic and social justice were able to be funded by these repayments. For example, he was able to pass public health reform in Argentina, union rights, and paid maternity leave, because all were funded by repayments. However, as the English funds began to dry up at the turn of the 1950s, Perón’s spending and the growth of government programs did not remain stable. Without the economic funding to support this growth, Argentina, and thus Perón, suffered.
Ideology
The pillars of the Peronist ideal, known as the “three flags,” are social justice, economic independence, and political sovereignty. Peronism is considered a third-position ideology because it rejects both capitalism and communism. It advocates corporatism as a means for mediating tensions within society, with the state responsible for negotiating compromises if conflicts arise. Traditionally, its adherents come primarily from the working class and unions, and the ideology has been described as proletarian in nature. Peronism, however, is a generally ill-defined ideology, with contradictory statements sometimes expressed.
The legacy of Peron is thought to transcend the confines of any political party in modern times and blend into the broader political landscape of Argentina.
Peron’s ideas were widely embraced by a variety of groups in Argentina across the political spectrum. Peron’s personal views later became a burden on the ideology, however. For example, his anti-clericalism did not strike a sympathetic chord with upper-class Argentinians. Peron’s public speeches were consistently nationalist and populist. In fact, Peronism draws many parallels with corporate nationalism due to the nationalization of many Argentinian corporations during Peron’s administrations. At the same time, labor unions became more corporate in nature, ceding the right to strike in the early to mid-1940s.
Defenders of Peronism describe the doctrine as populist in that they believe it embodies the interests of the masses, especially the most vulnerable members of society. Admirers hold Peron in esteem for his administration’s anti-imperialism, non-alignment, and socially progressive initiatives. Peron’s governments made social security universal, education free for all who qualified, and provisions for one paid week off before every major examination for working students. Vast low-income housing projects were created, and paid vacations became standard. All workers were guaranteed free medical care and mothers were given three paid months off prior to and after giving birth. Workers’ recreation centers were constructed all over the country, including a vast resort in the lower Sierras de Cordoba that included eight hotels, riding stables, swimming pools, movie theaters, and scores of cabins.
From the perspective of Peron’s opponents, however, Peronism was an authoritarian ideology. Peron was often compared to fascist dictators, accused of demagoguery, and his policies derided as too populist. Claiming to be an embodiment of Argentinian nationality, Peron’s government often silenced dissent by accusing opponents of being unpatriotic. Peron’s corporatism also drew attack from socialists who accused his administration of preserving capitalist exploitation and class division. Conservatives, on the other hand, rejected his modernist ideology and felt their status was threatened by the ascent of Peron’s governing officials. Liberals condemned Peron for his regime’s arbitrariness and dictatorial tendencies.
Influence and Contributions of Eva Peron
Eva Peron, popularly known as Evita, was instrumental as a symbol of hope to the common laborer during her husband’s first five-year plan. Her strong ties to the poor lent credibility to Juan Peron’s first presidential term and ushered in a new wave of supporters to his regime. She was loathed by the elite due to her humble origins, but she was adored by the poor for her work with the sick, elderly, and orphans. She was involved in behind-the-scenes work to secure women’s suffrage in 1947 and supported a women’s movement that concentrated on the rights of women, the poor, and the disabled. The extent of her role in her husband’s first term remains disputed, although it is clear that she was responsible for introducing social justice and equality into the national discourse. It is speculated that Eva’s influence on her husband led to the stipulations within the five-year plans that called for full employment, public healthcare and housing, labor benefits, raises, and humanitarian relief efforts.
Evita established the Eva Peron Foundation in 1948. Enjoying an annual budget of approximately 50 million USD, which was nearly equivalent to one percent of Argentinian GDP at the time, the Foundation had 14,000 employees and founded hundreds of new schools, clinics, old-age homes, and holiday facilities. It also distributed hundreds of thousands of household necessities, as well as paid for physicians’ visits, scholarships, and other benefits. During the 1951 presidential campaign, Evita replaced Juan Peron’s ailing running mate, Hortensio Quijano, to become the official candidate for vice president. Her political hopes, however, were defeated by her own health problems and opposition to the Peron-Evita ticket from within the military. On September 28 of the same year, an attempted coup was launched against Peron by General Benjamin Andres Menendez and elements within the Argentine Army. Though they were unsuccessful, they proved the final nail in the coffin of the first lady’s political ambitions. She died the following July.
Following the death of Eva Perón, Juan and his leadership struggled to lead in Argentina. Between 1952 and 1955, Juan Perón saw the economic fortunes turn, as Argentina struggled to support the new programs that he installed in the country. Mounting pressure on Perón from religious and military groups would start because of the massive changes that he brought to the country. By 1955, the military and navy rose up against Perón and pushed the leader into exile.
Between 1955 to 1958, Argentina was under a military dictatorship. This was a difficult time for the country because, in an attempt to remove any and all references to Peronism, the military dictatorship outlawed and jailed anyone who referenced Perón, Evita, unions, or any other references to the leadership. This government had great difficulty in establishing cohesion throughout the period.
Between 1958 to 1970, Argentina struggled as the military dictatorship turned power to civilians and allowed a democracy to return to Argentina.
The governments of the 1950s and 1960s struggled to find cohesion, many in the country wanted the populist leader Juan Perón to return to Argentina. The governments had very big problems creating national plans, presidential elections saw winners with total votes of about 30% of the total population. This meant that government parties had difficulty establishing political and economic power. At the same time, the economy of Argentina became increasingly tied to the United States. The two countries were very similar in products that they sold around the world, and this would mean that Argentine products often suffered at the market place due to the United States position of power in the Cold War.
Many called on the government to end the ban on Peronism in the 1960s. There was a period of tremendous changes inside of Argentina. The country would experience many of the same social movements of the youth that the United States and Europe saw during the same period. This would mean political and cultural troubles for Argentina in the period.
By 1970, the end of the ban on Peronism meant that the former president of Argentina was able to run for a third term in power. He was swept into office but there were significant problems with Perón in the 1970s. First, he was old, in his mid-70s. Much of his campaign focused on the return of unions and discussion of returning Argentina to the 1950s. This was another problem for many of the youth who did not understand Peronism’s goals and had a difficult time in seeing connections between Peronism and the youth movements that swept the country. Second, much of Perón’s charisma in the 1950s was his use of his wife Eva, yet by his third term he had a younger wife, Isabel, who was born and raised in Venezuela. Having limited understandings of Argentine culture and politics, Isabel struggled to connect Perón to his electoral base, as Evita had two decades before. Perón died in 1974, at the age of 78. His sudden death created a ripple effect in Argentine politics that would create a very deadly military dictatorship and the origins of the Dirty War.
National Reorganization and the Dirty War
The Dirty War began as the government became increasingly fearful and repressive of leftist dissidents. Also known as the Process of National Reorganization, The Dirty War was the name used by the Argentina Military Government for a period of state terrorism in Argentina from roughly 1974 to 1983. During this time, the military, security forces, and right-wing death squads such as the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance (Triple A), hunted down and killed left-wing guerrillas, political dissidents, and anyone believed to be associated with the socialist movement. A total of 7,158 left-wing activities, terrorists, and militants were victimized, including trade unionists, students, journalists, and Marxist and Peronist guerrillas. Official records account for 13,000 missing people, known as the “disappeared.” Meanwhile, leftist guerrillas accounted for 6,000 casualties among military and police forces, as well as civilians.
Background
The military, supported by a significant number of the general populace involved in the Radical and Socialist parties, opposed Juan Peron’s populist government and attempted to overthrow his regime once in 1951 and twice in 1955 before finally succeeding on a third attempt in 1955 during the Revolucion Libertadora. After the military took control, Peronism was outlawed.
Peronists began organizing a resistance movement centered around workplaces and trade unions, and the working classes sought economic and social improvements. Over time, as democratic rule was partially restored and promises to allow freedom of expression and other political liberties to Peronists was not respected, resistance groups militarized, forming guerrillas groups.
Jorge Ricardo Masetti, the leader of the Guevarist People’s Guerrillas Army (EGP) that infiltrated Bolivia’s army in 1964, is considered by some to be Argentina’s first disappeared person. Prior to 1973, the major revolutionary groups within Argentina were the Peronist Armed Forces (FAP), the Marxist-Leninist-Peronist Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), and the Marxist-Leninist Armed Forces of Liberation (FAL). Over time, many of these guerrillas forces combined or were effectively eradicated by the government. For example, FAR joined the Montoneros, formerly an urban group of intellectuals and students, and FAP and FAL were absorbed into the Marxist People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP). Meanwhile, the EGP and the Peronist Uturuncos were small enough to be overcome by government forces and ceased to exist. By the early 1970s, the consolidated guerrillas groups that remained were kidnapping and assassinating high-ranking military and police officers almost weekly.
A Decade of Violence
The extreme left bombed and destroyed numerous military and police buildings in its campaign against the government, but unfortunately a number of civilian and non-governmental buildings were targeted as well. For instance, the Sheraton Hotel in Buenos Aires was bombed in 1972, killing a woman and injuring her husband. A crowded theater in downtown Buenos Aires was also bombed in 1975. In 1978, a powerful bomb meant to kill an Argentine admiral ripped through a nine-story apartment building, killing three civilians and trapping many others under the debris.
In 1973, as Juan Peron returned from exile, the Ezeiza massacre marked the end of an alliance between left- and right-wing factions of Peronism. In the subsequent year, Peron withdrew his support of the Montoneros shortly before his death. During the presidency of his widow Isabel Martinez de Peron, the far-right paramilitary death squad Triple A emerged, increasing armed struggles. In 1975, Isabel signed a number of decrees empowering the military and the police to step up efforts to destroy left-wing subversion, particularly the ERP. Isabel was ousted from power the subsequent year, 1976, by a military coup.
U.S. Involvement
The United States was very interested in the conflict involving Argentina’s domestic politics. Much of this has to do with the Cold War and fears of a communist takeover in Argentina. The United States began the heavy involvement in Argentine politics during the rise of Perón in the 1940s, yet because of the leaders’ presentation of the United States as an imperial nation, much of the United States’s efforts went in vain.
By the 1950s, following Perón’s exile, the United States was able to begin to have a bigger impact in Argentine life. For example, United States corporations began buying Argentine television stations and putting on US programs such as “I Love Lucy” and the “Andy Griffith Show.” This was a radical change for both Argentina and the Southern Cone, because Argentine media had historically been the major hub of most of the media created in Latin America. United States television influence created a radical shift not only in Argentina but also to the rest of South America.
Throughout the 1960s and early 1970s, the United States became increasingly afraid of communism spreading throughout Latin America, and following the Cuban Revolution, these fears put a bigger emphasis on Latin American life and culture. The Nixon government was hyper focused on Latin America and started a program known as Operation Condor, which focused on how to increase United States influence in Chile and Argentina, so as to stop the spread of socialism and communism in both states.
In August 2016, the U.S. State Department released 1,080 pages of declassified State Department documents that revealed a growing hostility between the administration of US President Jimmy Carter and the 1976 junta that overthrew Isabel. The previous administration under Gerald Ford was strongly sympathetic to the junta, with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger even advising Argentina’s Foreign Minister, Cesar Guzzetti, to carry out anti-Communist policies before Congress was back in session. However, Carter took issue in particular with Argentina’s growing list of human rights violations. Despite this, there is no documentation suggesting that the U.S. government had direct involvement or knowledge of the developments leading up to or following the coup that ousted Isabel.
The National Reorganization Process
The juntas, led by Jorge Rafael Videla until 1981 and subsequently by Roberto Viola and Leopoldo Galtieri until 1983, organized and carried out strong repression of political dissidents via the government’s military and security forces, which they referred to as their National Reorganization Process. They were responsible for illegal arrests, torture, killings, and the forced disappearance of an estimated 9,000 to 30,000 people. Assassinations occurred via mass shootings and throwing live citizens from airplanes to their death in the ocean below. Additionally, 12,000 prisoners, many of whom had not been convicted via any legal processes, were detained in a network of 340 secret concentration camps located throughout Argentina. The government coordinated actions with other South American dictatorships as well.
Faced with increasing public opposition and severe economic problems, the military tried to regain popularity by occupying the disputed Falkland Islands. It suffered a lopsided defeat against Great Britain, which was in possession of the territories, during the subsequent Falklands War, and was forced to resign governing powers in disgrace; this paved the way for the restoration of Argentinian democracy.
Alfonsín's Presidency
Raul Ricardo Alfonsin Foulkes was an Argentine lawyer, politician, and statesman who served as the President of Argentina from December 10, 1983 until July 8, 1989. He was elected a deputy in the legislature of the Buenos Aires province in 1958 during the presidency of Arturo Frondizi and a national deputy during the presidency of Arturo Umberto Illia. Although Alfonsín began his administration well-liked due to his prosecution of war crimes and consolidation of Argentina’s democratic institutions, his inability to prevent worsening economic crises caused his popularity to decline. Alfonsín was then able to move into the presidency. Alfonsín opposed both sides of the Dirty War and filed several writs of Habeas corpus, requesting the freedom of victims of forced disappearances during the National Reorganization Process. He denounced the crimes of the military dictatorships of other countries and opposed actions of both sides of the Falklands War. He became the leader of the Radical Civil Union (UCR) following Ricardo Balbin’s death and was the Radical candidate for president during the 1983 elections, which he won.
Alfonsín’s presidential inauguration was attended by Isabel Peron in a sign of support, despite internal recriminations regarding the Peronist defeat. Left-wing terrorism had been neutralized by this time, but both parties were eager to prevent the return of right-wing military rule, and there were factions within the military eager to reinstate an authoritarian government.
Alfonsin assumed the presidency after the darkest period of dictatorial rule in Argentina’s modern history. Three days after assuming the office of president, Alfonsín sent a bill to Congress to revoke the self-amnesty law established by the military, as he had promised to do while on the campaign trail. He also ordered the initiation of judicial cases against guerrillas and military leaders, as well as the extradition of guerrillas leaders living abroad. These acts were well-received by groups such as the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo that were seeking reparations for the actions of the military during the Dirty War.
Prosecution of the Military
The Trial of the Juntas began at the Supreme Court in April 1985 and lasted the remainder of the year. It was the first time the leaders of a military coup were put on trial in Argentina. In December, the tribunal handed down life sentences for Jorge Videla and former Navy Chief Emilio Massera, as well as a 17-year sentence for Roberto Eduardo Viola. The trials were followed by bomb attacks and rumors of military protests and coups. In order to appease the military, Alfonsin proposed the full stop law, which set a deadline for Dirty War-related prosecutions. The Congress approved the law despite strong public opposition. Prosecutors rushed to start cases before the deadline, filing 487 charges against 300 officers, 100 of whom were still in active service.
Two officers refused to appear in court, starting mutinies in Cordoba and Campo de Mayo. The rebels were referred to as Carapintadas, which is Spanish for “painted faces”—a reference to their use of military camouflage. The General Confederation of Labor (CGT) called for a general strike in support of Alfonsin, and large masses rallied in the Plaza de Mayo to support the government. Alfonsin negotiated directly with the rebels and secured their surrender. However, the timing was exploited by the military and opposition parties, and they painted the outcome as a surrender by Alfonsin.
Alfonsin’s first priority in office was to consolidate democracy in the country, incorporate the armed forces into their standard role within a civilian government, and prevent further military coups. He used budget and personnel cuts to attempt to reduce the political power of the military. Despite the revocation of self-amnesty and prosecution of senior officers, Alfonsin was willing to dismiss charges against lower-ranking military personnel under the principle of command responsibility. He also created the National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP), composed of several well-known personalities, to document cases of forced disappearances, human rights violations, and abduction of children. In its “Nunca mas” report, the CONADEP revealed the wide scope of crimes committed during the Dirty War and how the Supreme Council of the military supported the military’s actions against guerrillas.
Relationship with Unions
Labor unions were still controlled by Peronist elements, and Alfonsin sought to reduce their influence, fearing they would become destabilizing forces for the fledgling democracy. He rejected their custom of holding single-candidacy internal elections and felt union administrations were totalitarian rather than a genuine reflection of the demands of the workforce. He proposed changing the laws by which those internal elections abided and removing union leaders appointed during the millitary junta. The CGT rejected the proposal, claiming it was too interventionist, and prompted Peronist politicians to vote against it. The law was approved by the Chamber of Deputies, but it failed to pass in the senate by one vote. A second bill was proposed that simply called for new internal elections, without changing the laws by which they abided, and that bill was approved. As a result, the labor unions remained largely Peronist.
Alfonsin made use of a regulation established during the junta that allowed the president to regulate the level of wages, and authorized wage increases every 3 months to keep up with inflation. The CGT rejected this and proposed instead that wages should be determined by free negotiations. Alfonsin allowed strike actions, forbidden during the junta, which also allowed the unions to expand their influence. There were 13 general strikes and thousands of minor labor conflicts during his administration. Conflicts centered around high inflation, and the unions remained supportive of the president in the face of military rebellions and despite political differences.
Economic Policy
Alfonsin began his term with many economic problems. Argentina’s foreign debt was nearly 43 billion dollars by the end of 1983, and the country narrowly prevented a sovereign default in 1982. During that year, GDP fell by 5.6% and manufacturing profits fell by 55%. Unemployment was around ten percent, and inflation was nearly 209%. It also seemed unlikely the country would receive badly needed foreign investment.
Many possible solutions, such as devaluation of the currency, privatization of industry, or restrictions on imports, would have proven unpopular. Instead, Bernardo Grinspun, the first minister of the economy, arranged to increase wages, which caused inflation to decrease significantly. Negotiations were also entered to obtain more favorable terms on the country’s foreign debt, but those were unsuccessful. Grinspun resigned in March 1985 when debt reached $1 billion. He was succeeded by Juan Vital Sourrouille, who developed the Austral plan.
The Austral plan was a success in the short term. It froze prices and wages, choking inflation for some time; put a temporary hold on the printing of paper money; arranged for spending cuts, and established a new currency: the Austral. However, inflation rose again by the end of 1985, the CGT opposed the wage freeze, and the business community opposed the price freeze.
With the support of the World Bank, Alfonsin’s government attempted new measures to improve the state of Argentina’s economy in 1987. The government increased taxes and privatizations and decreased spending. However, many of these measures could not be effectively enforced, and the government lost the 1987 midterm elections. Many of the large unions that previously supported the government attempted to distance themselves from it, and the business community was unable to suggest a clear course of action to resolve the crisis that was unraveling.
A “spring plan” was proposed to keep the economy stable until general elections took place in 1989. The plan consisted of freezing prices and wages, as well as reducing the federal deficit; it earned even worse public reception than the Austral plan, with no political parties fully endorsing it. Meanwhile, the World Bank and IMF refused to extend credit to Argentina, and many big exporters refused to sell dollars to their central bank, depleting reserves. The austral was devalued in February 1989 and the already high inflation evolved into hyperinflation. As a result, Alfonsin’s government lost the general election to Peronist Carlos Menem.
Argentina as an Example during the Cold War
Argentina struggled with the relationship of the United States and the Soviet Union in the period between 1955 – 1989. The ups and downs that the Argentine population saw are very similar to that of other Latin American states. Many countries in Latin America attempted to follow ideas of democracy; instead they experienced the brutal dictatorships that often accompanied the period of decolonization for the rest of the world. Taking the ups and downs of Argentina as a case study, in the next section, the examination of other Latin American states in the period is going to demonstrate the problems of the Cold War in this region of the world.
Chile in the Cold War
Many of the problems of Argentina were similar to what was happening in Chile. The country suffered significantly due to the Great Depression. The Ibanez government was very repressive. Following World War II, the country had some economic rebounding because of political and cultural links with Europe. Yet, the United States’s fear of a socialist state in Latin America again drove many of the policies and problems that Chile would face in the late 1960s – 1980s. The Dirty War in Argentina was linked to the Operation Condor in Chile, where a president died and a brutal dictator rose to power with the backing of the United States.
Learning Objectives
- Evaluate the role of the United States on Chile in the Cold War.
- Analyze the impoact of Allende's death on Chile.
- Evaluate the problems of the military dictatorship in Chile.
Key Terms / Key Concepts
ceasefire: a temporary stoppage of war in which each side agrees with the other to suspend aggressive actions
command responsibility: sometimes referred to as superior responsibility, the legal doctrine of hierarchical accountability in cases of war crimes
disappeared: a person who is secretly abducted or imprisoned by a state or political organization, or by a third party with the authorization, support, or acquiescence of a state or political organization, especially if there is a refusal to acknowledge the person’s fate or whereabouts, which essentially places the victim outside the protection of the law
hyperinflation: in economics, when a country experiences very high and accelerating rates of inflation, which erodes the real value of local currency and causes the population to minimize their holdings of said money
military junta: an oligarchic form of government that differs from a civilian dictatorship in a number of ways, including motivations for seizing power, the institutions through which rule is organized, and the ways in which leaders leave positions of power (Many military juntas have viewed themselves as saving the nation from corrupt or myopic civilian politicians. Military leaders often rule as a junta, selecting one as the head.)
The Birth of Mass Politics, 1952-1964
Due to the protectionist policies of the radical governments and their predecessors, Chile had developed a strong, national industry, which led to a renewal of the economic and social structure of the country. For the first time in its history, agriculture ceased being the primary productive sector; instead, mining and the service sector became increasingly important to the national economy. At the same time, Chile’s political climate was becoming increasingly divided. The 1952 presidential election was carved up among many competing parties, including conservatives, liberals, socialists, radicals, and an emerging centrist Christian Democrat Party; the latter receiving support from a large specter of personalities. Additionally, for the first time in Chile’s history, women’s suffrage was legalized.
Four candidates stood up in the 1952 election. Arturo Matte was the centrist candidate presented by the Conservative and Liberal parties; Salvador Allende served as the Socialist Party’s candidate in his first candidacy to the presidency; the Radical Party supported Pedro Enrique Alfonso; and General Carlos Ibanez ran for the office as an independent. Ibanez campaigned on a platform of eliminating political corruption, but he remained vague in his proposals and provided no clear position as to his position within the political spectrum. He won the election on September 5, 1952, with 46.8% of the popular vote.
Ibanez’s election was ratified by Congress, and he took office on December 4.
Once in office, Ibanez focused on rallying his supporters to win a majority in the 1953 legislative elections. His supporters consisted of the right-wing Partido Agrario Laborista (PAL) and dissidents within the Socialist Party, which had formed the Popular Socialist Party. Some feminist political unions also lent their support to Ibanez. Many such supporters stacked Ibanez’s initial cabinet, which despite its internal fragility, helped to win some seats in the 1953 elections. Nonetheless, Ibanez remained at the mercy of a unified opposition during his tenure as president.
Ibanez left much of the governing during his second term to his cabinet, and indeed his second term progressed as a modest political success. Ibanez won the support of many left-wingers by repealing the Ley de Defensa de la Democracia (Law for the Defense of Democracy), which had banned the Communist Party. However, in 1954, a copper mine strike spread across the country, and Ibanez proclaimed a state of siege in response. Congress immediately opposed this executive measure and put an end to it. Ibanez also froze wages and prices in order to put an end to the chronic inflation of the Chilean economy. Unfortunately, these same policies stopped growth and inflation continued to skyrocket, leading to relative civil unrest.
A movement of Ibanistas, consisting mainly of young army officers and inspired by the movement surrounding Argentine President Juan Domingo Peron, formed groups aimed at creating a new dictatorship under Ibanez. Controversy erupted when the public learned that Ibanez met with these conspirators. Additionally, Ibanez’s hostility towards the Federacion de Estudiantes de la Universidad de Chile student trade union led to outbreaks of violence during demonstrations. As a result, PAL withdrew itself from Ibanez’s government, leaving him isolated. Meanwhile, the Radicals, Socialists, and Communists organized the Frente de Accion Popular (Front for Popular Action) and concentrated their efforts around presidential candidate Salvador Allende.
Allende and Popular Unity
Salvador Allende was the president of Chile from 1970 until 1973 and the head of the Popular Unity government. He was the first ever Marxist to be elected to the national presidency of a democratic country. Although the 1970 Chilean presidential election was lawful, the Chilean Senate declared the Allende government unlawful in August 1973 due to its practice of unconstitutional expropriation of private property. Allende’s presidency was cut short by a military coup shortly thereafter.
The United States was distrustful of Chile’s President Salvador Allende due to his Marxist beliefs and policies, leading to a military coup ousting Allende from power that was strongly encouraged by the CIA.
Chilean Presidential Election, 1970
Allende ran with the Popular Unity coalition during the 1970 presidential election. Succeeding the FRAP left-wing coalition, it was comprised primarily of leftist political parties, including the Socialist Party, the Communist Party, the Radical Party, the Party of the Radical Left (until 1972), the Social Democratic Party, MAPU, or Movimient de Accion Popular Unitario, and the Christian Left, which joined the coalition in 1971. Allende won a plurality of the popular vote at 36.2%, with a platform promising nationalization of the mineral industry and income/land redistribution. Conservative former president Jorge Alessandri, the candidate from the National Party, received slightly fewer votes, approximately 34.9%. According to the Chilean constitution, Congress had to decide between the two candidates with the most votes, and according to precedent, Congress tended to choose the candidate with the largest number of votes.
An active campaign against Allende’s confirmation within Congress resulted from the Congressinal decision, including clandestine efforts to prevent Allende from being inaugurated. In the end, his presidency was only ratified once he signed a Statute of Constitutional Guarantees, convincing the majority of Christian Democratic senators who favored Alessandri of Allende’s allegiance to democracy. Having signed this statute, members of the Christian Democratic Party in the Senate were willing to vote in favor of granting the presidency to Allende.
"The Chilean Way to Socialism"
While in office, Allende pursued a policy he called “La via chilena al socialismo,” or “the Chilean way to socialism.” This policy included nationalization of certain large-scale industries—such as copper and healthcare, land redistribution, the continuation of the educational policies of his predecessor Eduardo Frei Montalva, and a program guaranteeing free milk for children. Eduardo Frei’s government already partially nationalized the copper industry by acquiring a 51% share in foreign-owned mines, but copper remained the primary U.S. business in Chile during this time.
Early on, Congress supported Allende’s extensive vision for government involvement in the economy, especially since the Popular Unity and Christian Democratic parties combined had a clear majority in the legislature. However, the government’s efforts to pursue these policies led to strong outpouring of opposition from landowners, some middle-class sectors, financiers, the Roman Catholic Church, and the rightist National Party. Eventually, the Christian Democrats united with the National Party in Congress as opposition grew.
The Popular Unity coalition itself was far from perfectly united around the platform of the president. Allende himself was a more moderate representative of the Socialist Party and was committed to the principles of democracy. He was supported by the Communist Party, which, although less committed to the principles of representative democracy, favored a cautious and gradual approach to the vast reforms that had been proposed. By contrast, the radical left wing of the Socialist Party wanted an immediate disruption to the existing capitalist system, even if it meant resorting to violent means.
During his first year in office, Allende’s government achieved economic growth, reductions in inflation and unemployment, redistribution of income, and increases in consumption. The government also significantly increased salaries and wages, reduced taxes, and introduced free distribution of certain items deemed necessities. Groups previously excluded from the state labor insurance scheme, such as the self-employed or those employed by small businesses, were included for the first time. Additionally, pensions were increased for widows, invalids, orphans, and the elderly. And the National Milk Plan provided more than 3 million liters of milk per day in 1970, free of charge.
Foreign Relations
Soviet Union
Allende’s predecessor, Eduardo Frei, had improved relations with the USSR, and in February 1970, Frei’s government signed Chile’s first cultural and scientific agreement with the Soviet Union. When Allende assumed the presidency, he attempted to maintain normal relations with the United States. However, as a result of Chile’s nationalization of the copper industry, the US cut off credits and increased its support to the opposition. As a result, Allende’s government was forced to seek alternative sources of trade and finance. Chile gained commitments from the USSR to invest approximately $400 million in Chile over the course of the next six years, though that number was smaller than the amount Allende hoped to receive. Trade between the two countries did not significantly increase and mainly involved the purchase of Soviet equipment. When Allende visited the USSR in late 1972 to request more aid and additional lines of credit, he was turned down. In mid-1973, the USSR approved the delivery of weaponry to the Chilean army. However, when news of an attempted army coup to overthrow Allende reached Soviet officials, the shipment was redirected to another country.
U.S. Opposition to Allende
U.S. opposition to Allende began several years before he was elected President of Chile, but it escalated once the prospect of a second Marxist regime being established in the Western Hemisphere became more likely (the first being Fidel Castro’s government in Cuba). The administration of U.S. President Richard Nixon was already embroiled in the Vietnam War and the broader Cold War with the Soviet Union. The U.S. government intended to encourage Allende’s resignation, overthrow, or defeat by the presidential election of 1976. To this end, the Nixon administration clandestinely funded independent and non-state media and labor unions within Chile and directed other governmental entities to not begin new bilateral economic aid commitments with the government of Chile. The United States did, however, provide humanitarian aid to Chile, as well as forgave old loans valued at $200 million from 1971 to 1972. The United States also did not invoke the Hickenlooper Amendment, which would have required an immediate cut-off of U.S aid due to Allende’s nationalizations. Allende received new sources of credit valued between $600 million and $950 million in 1972 and $547 million by June 1973. The International Monetary Fund also loaned $100 million to Chile during the Allende years.
The U.S. government used two tactics when countering Allende’s government. “Track I” was a State Department initiative designed to thwart Allende by subverting Chilean elected officials within the bounds of the Chilean constitution. This tactic excluded the CIA. Track I was expanded to encompass a number of policies with the ultimate goal of creating conditions that would encourage a coup. “Track II” was a CIA operation overseen by Henry Kissinger and the CIA’s director of covert operations: Thomas Karamessine. Track II excluded the State Department and Department of Defense. The goal of Track II was to find and support Chilean military officers who would engage in a coup.
Crisis: Congressional Resolutions
On August 22, 1973, the Christian Democrats and the National Party members of the Chamber of Deputies voted 81 to 47 in favor of a resolution that asked the authorities to preserve Chilean democracy in face of the threat Allende’s government presented. They believed Allende’s policies infringed upon the freedoms guaranteed by the Chilean constitution and accused Allende of attempting to establish a totalitarian order upon the country. Most accusations centered around a perceived disregard for the separation of powers and the erosion of legislative and judicial prerogatives in favor of granting these powers to the executive branch of government. Finally, the resolution condemned the creation and development of government-protected armed forces. President Allende’s efforts to reorganize the military and police forces were characterized as nefarious attempts to use the armed and police forces for partisan ends, destroy their institutional hierarchy, and politically infiltrate their ranks.
Two days later on August 24, 1973, Allende responded point-by point to the accusations. He accused Congress of encouraging sedition, civil war, and even a coup. He also pointed out that the declaration failed to obtain the required two-thirds majority constitutionally required to bring an accusation against the president and argued that the legislature was trying to usurp the executive role.
1973 Chilean Coup D'etat
In early September 1973, Allende floated the idea of resolving the congressional resolution crisis with a referendum. However, the Chilean military seized the opportunity created by the Chamber of Deputies’ August 22nd Resolution to oust Allende on September 11, 1973. As the Presidential Palace was surrounded and bombed, Allende committed suicide.
A September 2000 report released by the CIA using declassified documents related to the military coup found that the CIA had probably approved of and encouraged the 1973 coup, but there was no evidence that the U.S actually participated in it. This view has been challenged by some historians, such as Tim Weiner and Peter Kornbluh, who have stated that the covert support of the United States was crucial to the preparation for the coup, the coup itself, and the consolidation of the regime afterward.
The Pinochet Years
Pinochet’s regime represented a violent swing to authoritarianism following Allende’s Marxist administration. Augusto Jose Ramon Pinochet Ugarte was the President of Chile between 1973 and 1990, as well as Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army from 1973 to 1998. He was also the president of the Government Junta of Chile between 1973 and 1981. His rule of Chile is considered a dictatorship. Pinochet assumed power in Chile following a U.S.-backed coup d’etat on September 11, 1973, which overthrew the democratically elected Popular Unity government of President Salvador Allende and ended civilian rule. In December 1974, the ruling millitary junta appointed Pinochet the Supreme Head of the Nation by joint decree.
Human Rights Violations
Human rights violations during the military government of Chile refer to human rights abuses, persecution of opponents, political repression, and state terrorism committed by the Chilean armed forces and the police, government agents, and civilians in the service of security agencies. According to the Commission of Truth and Reconciliation (Rettig Commission) and the National Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture (Valech Commission), the number of direct victims of human rights violations in Chile accounts for at least 35,000 people: 28,000 tortured, 2,279 executed, and 1,248 missing. In addition, some 200,000 people suffered exile and an unknown number went through clandestine centers and illegal detention. The systematic human rights violations committed by the military government of Chile under Pinochet included gruesome acts of physical and sexual abuse, as well as psychological damage. From September 11, 1973, to March 11, 1990, Chilean armed forces, the police, and those aligned with the millitary junta were involved in institutionalizing fear and terror in Chile.
Political Suppression
Following its assumption of power in 1973, the government junta formally banned socialist, Marxist, and other leftist parties that comprised former President Salvador Allende’s Popular Unity coalition. On September 13, 1973, the junta dissolved Congress and outlawed or suspended all political activities, including suspension of the 1925 constitution. Eduardo Frei, Allende’s predecessor as president, initially supported the coup along with other Christian Democratic politicians. Later, however, they assumed opposition roles to the military rulers, though by that time many of them already lost much of their public influence. The Catholic Church, which first expressed its approval of military rule over Allende’s Marxist government, was now led by Cardinal Raul Silva Henriquez, one of the most outspoken critics of the regime’s social and economic policies.
From 1974 to 1977, the DINA (National Intelligence Directorate) and other agencies, such as the Joint Command, were the main institutions that committed acts of repression. It was during this period that most forced disappearances took place. In DINA-established interrogation and detention camps, former members of Allende’s Marxist government and Leftist movements like Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionario were incarcerated and brutally tortured. A large proportion of the Chilean population was vulnerable to government surveillance.
Disappearances
“Disappearing subversives” was a central instrument of state terror administered by the Chilean military regime. According to the Rettig Report, 1,248 people were “disappeared” by the Pinochet regime. This number remains a source of contention, however, as hundreds of bodies have yet to be discovered. Many who disappeared were neither given the chance to escape nor to become asylum seekers elsewhere, and their bodies were deliberately hidden in undisclosed locations. Many people were last seen in detention or torture centers run by intelligence agencies of the military regime.
Following General Pinochet’s arrest in 1998, Chile made a renewed effort to uncover the atrocities of the past. For the first time in several decades, human rights lawyers and members of the armed forces investigated where the bodies of the disappeared were buried. On January 7, 2000, Chilean President Ricardo Lagos made a 15-minute nationwide address, revealing that the armed forces had uncovered information on the fate of approximately 180 people who had disappeared. According to Lagos, the bodies of at least 150 of these people were thrown into lakes, rivers, and the Pacific Ocean. The whereabouts of hundreds of more bodies remain unknown.
Economy and Free Market Reforms
After the military took over the government in 1973, a period of dramatic economic changes began. The Chilean economy was still faltering in the months following the coup. As the millitary junta itself was not particularly skilled in remedying the persistent economic difficulties, it appointed a group of Chilean economists who were educated at the University of Chicago. This group, known as the Chicago Boys, was given financial and ideological support from Pinochet, the United States, and international financial institutions. They advocated laissez-faire, free-market, neo-liberal, and fiscally conservative policies in stark contrast to the extensive nationalization and centrally-planned economic programs supported by Allende. As a result, Chile was drastically transformed from an economy isolated from the rest of the world with strong government intervention into a liberalized, world-integrated economy where market forces were left free to guide most of the economy’s decisions.
From an economic point of view, the era can be divided into two periods. The first, from 1973 to 1982, corresponds to the period when most of the reforms were implemented. The period ended with the international debt crisis and the collapse of the Chilean economy. Unemployment was extremely high, above 20 percent, and a large proportion of the banking sector had become bankrupt. The following period was characterized by new reforms and economic recovery. Some economists argue that the recovery was due to a turnaround of Pinochet’s free market policy; during this time he renationalized many of the industries that were nationalized under Allende and fired the Chicago Boys from their government posts.
Social Consequences
The economic policies espoused by the Chicago Boys and implemented by the junta initially caused several economic indicators to decline for Chile’s lower classes. Between 1970 and 1989, there were large cuts to incomes and social services. Wages decreased by eight percent. Family allowances in 1989 were 28% of what they had been in 1970 and budgets for education, health, and housing dropped more than 20% on average. Massive increases in military spending and cuts in funding to public services coincided with falling wages and steady rises in unemployment. The junta relied on the middle class, huge foreign corporations, and foreign loans to maintain itself.
Financial conglomerates became major beneficiaries of the liberalized economy. Large foreign banks reinstated the credit cycle, and international lending organizations such as the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and Inter-American Development Bank also lent vast sums to Pinochet’s regime. Additionally, many foreign multinational corporations returned to Chile, such as International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT), Dow Chemical, and Firestone, which was previously expropriated by Allende.
Relationship with the United States
Overall, the United States maintained significantly friendlier relations with Pinochet than it did with Allende. A document titled “CIA Activities in Chile,” released by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 2000, revealed that the CIA actively supported the millitary junta after the overthrow of Allende and made many of Pinochet’s officers paid contacts of the CIA or U.S. military despite records detailing human rights abuses. The United States provided substantial support to the military regime between 1973 and 1979, although it criticized Chile in public. In 1976, the United States went beyond verbal condemnation of the regime and placed an embargo on arms sales to Chile that remained in effect until the restoration of democracy in 1989. Presumably, as international concerns grew surrounding Chilean repression, the United States did not want to be seen as an accomplice to the junta. Other prominent U.S. allies like the UK, France, and West Germany, however, did not block arms sales to Pinochet and benefited from the lack of American competition.
The Chilean Constitution of 1988
Due to pressure from big business, the international community, and general unease with his rule, Pinochet was denied a second eight-year term as president during the 1988 national plebiscite.
Following the September 11, 1973 coup d’etat, Army General Augusto Pinochet was designated president of the newly established millitary junta government. He and Air Force General Gustavo Leigh, Navy Admiral Jose Toribio Merino, and Carabinero Chief General Cesar Mendoza verbally agreed to rotate presidential duties; but, shortly thereafter, the junta established an advisory committee and Pinochet staffed it with his loyal Army officers. One of the first recommendations brought forward by the advisory committee was to do away with a rotating presidency, arguing it would lead to too many administrative problems and confusion.
In March 1974, Pinochet verbally attacked the Christian Democratic Party and stated there was no set timetable for the country’s return to civilian rule. Concurrently, a commission set up by the junta was working on drawing up a new constitution. By October 5, 1978, the commission had finished its work. During the next two years, the proposed outline was studied by the Council of State, presided over by former president Jorge Alessandri. In July 1980, a draft of the constitution was presented to Pinochet and the governing junta.
On September 11, 1980, seven years after the coup d’etat that brought the millitary junta to power, a constitutional referendum took place in which the new constitution was approved by 67% of voters. Some observers, however, argued that the referendum was carried out in a highly irregular way and the outcome was thus fraudulent. Nonetheless, the new constitution took effect on March 11, 1981, and established a transition period of eight years during which Pinochet would continue to exercise executive power and the junta would yield legislative powers. Before the end of that period, a candidate for president was to be proposed by the Commanders in Chief of the Armed Forces and Carabinero Chief General for a subsequent term of eight years, and the proposed candidate would need to be ratified by registered voters in a national plebiscite. On August 30, 1988, Pinochet was declared the presidential candidate.
Plebiscite of October 8, 1988
The millitary junta began to shift leadership tactics in the late 1970s. Due to increasing resistance and attendant problems with General Pinochet’s rule, Air Force General Gustavo Leigh was expelled from the junta in 1978 and replaced by General Fernando Matthei. Throughout the 1980s, the government gradually permitted greater freedom of assembly, speech, and association, including trade union activities. In 1985, Cesar Mendoza, a member of the junta since 1973, was forced to resign as a result of the Caso Degollados (“slit throats case”) in which three Communist Party members were assassinated. The following year, Carmen Gloria Quintana, a woman detained by an army patrol during a street demonstration against Pinochet, was burned alive in what became known as the Caso Quemado (“burnt alive case”). These horrofoc events rallied those who believed the country should move towards a more democratic form of governance. It was in this context that the 1988 Chilean national plebiscite took place, in which voters would accept or reject a single candidate proposed by the millitary junta.
The plebiscite presented two choices to voters: vote yes and extend Pinochet’s mandate for another eight years, or vote no and Pinochet and the junta would continue in power for only one more year. The outcome was that Pinochet was denied a second eight-year term by 54.5% of the vote. Presidential and parliamentary elections would take place three months before Pinochet’s term expired, with the newly elected president and Congress taking office March 11, 1990. The fact that the dictatorship respected the results is attributed to pressure from big business, the international community, and general popular unease with Pinochet’s rule.
Open presidential and congressional elections were held in December 1989, and the new democratically-elected president, Patricio Aylwin of the Christian Democratic Party, assumed power as planned in March. Due to the transitional provisions of the constitution, Pinochet remained as Commander-in-Chief of the Army until March 1998
The Guatemalan Civil War
The Guatemalan Civil War spanned nearly four decades and took place from 1960 to 1996. It stemmed from a number of institutionalized grievances among different social classes, and included a large-scale, one-sided campaign of violence against the civilian population by the state. It was fought between the government of Guatemala and various leftist rebel groups supported chiefly by ethnic Maya indigenous people and Ladino peasants, who together make up the rural poor. The government forces of Guatemala have been condemned for committing genocide against the Maya population of Guatemala during the civil war and for widespread human rights violations against civilians.
Learning Objectives
Analyze the Guatemalan Civil War on the population.
Key Terms / Key Concepts
ceasefire: a temporary stoppage of war in which each side agrees with the other to suspend aggressive actions
command responsibility: sometimes referred to as superior responsibility, the legal doctrine of hierarchical accountability in cases of war crimes
corporatism: also known as corporativism, corporatism is the sociopolitical organization of society by major interest, or corporate, groups
disappeared: a person who is secretly abducted or imprisoned by a state or political organization, or by a third party with the authorization, support, or acquiescence of a state or political organization, especially if there is a refusal to acknowledge the person’s fate or whereabouts, which essentially places the victim outside the protection of the law
genocide: the intentional act to destroy a people (usually defined as an ethnic, national, racial, or religious group) in whole or in part
guerrilla: a participant in an irregular form of warfare in which small groups engage in military tactics including ambushes, sabotage, raids, petty warfare, hit-and-run tactics, and mobility to fight a larger and less mobile traditional military
After the 1871 revolution, the Liberal government of Justo Rufino Barrios escalated coffee production in Guatemala, which required much land and many workers. To support these needs, Barrios established the Settler Rule Book, which forced the native population to work for Criollo and German settler landowners in return for low wages. Barrios also confiscated the native population’s land, which had been protected during Spanish rule and the Conservative government of Rafael Carrera. Barrios redistributed the confiscated indigenous land to his Liberal friends, who in turn became important landowners. While societies established through Spanish colonilzation had an inherent class division, this confiscation and redistribution of lands from one class to another drove a further wedge between classes.
By the 1940s Guatemalan society was composed of three sharply defined classes:
- Criollos were a minority group who descended from both the ancient families of the Spaniards that conquered Central America and the Natives who had been conquered by the Spaniards. As of the 1920s, the Criollos led the country both politically and intellectually by virtue of their education, which, although poor by European standards of the time, remained superior to that of the rest of the people in the country. That was partially because Criollo families controlled or owned most of the cultivated areas of Guatemala and were the only group allowed in either of the main political parties.
- The Guatemalan middle class, Ladinos, was composed of people with heritage from the native and black populations, as well as that of Criollos. Ladinos held almost no political power in the 1920s and made up the bulk of artisans, storekeepers, tradesmen, and minor officials. In the eastern part of the country, many Ladinos were agricultural laborers.
- The majority of the Guatemalan population was composed of indigenous peoples referred to as “Indios.” Many had no formal education and served as soldiers or agricultural workers. Within the indigenous population were further categories: “Mozos colonos” settled on plantations and were given small piece of land to cultivate on their own in return for their work on the plantation itself, while “mozos jornaleros” were day-laborers who were contracted to work for certain periods of time and paid a daily wage in return. Both of these categories typically worked to pay off debts to higher class individuals, who in turn encouraged the assumption of further debt on the part of the indigenous person. Often, due to the large amount of debt and small amount of pay, a mozo essentially became an indentured servant to the owner of their debt. If a mozo refused to work or attempted to run away, the owner of their debt could have them pursued and even imprisoned.
Some indigenous people remained independent tillers, who lived in remote provinces and survived by growing a subsistence crop of maize, beans, or wheat. Occasionally a small margin of their crop would be available for sale in town markets, but the travel to get to these markets could be arduous, given the mountainous terrain and lack of infrastructure.
Initial Phases of the Civil War
Democratic elections during the Guatemalan Revolution in 1944 and 1951 brought popular leftist governments to power, but a United States backed coup d’état in 1954 installed the military regime of Carlos Castillo Armas, followed by a series of conservative military dictators.
On November 13, 1960, a group of left-wing junior military officers from the national military academy led a failed revolt against the autocratic government of General Ydigoras Fuentes, who usurped power in 1958 following the assassination of incumbent Armas. The surviving officers fled into the hills of eastern Guatemala and later established communication with the Cuban government of Fidel Castro. By 1962, those surviving officers had established an insurgent movement known as the MR-13 (Movimiento Revolucionario 13 Noviembre), named after the date of the initial officers’ revolt. Through the early phase of the conflict, the MR-13 was a principal component of the insurgent movement in Guatemala.
The MR-13 later initiated contact with the outlawed PGT (Guatemalan Labour Party)—composed and led by middle-class intellectuals and students—and a student organization called the Movimiento 12 de Abril (April 12 Movement). These groups merged into a coalition guerrillas organization called the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) in December 1962. Also affiliated with the FAR was the FGEI (Edgar Ibarra Guerrillas Front). The MR-13, PGT, and FGEI each operated in different parts of the country as three separate “frentes” (fronts). The MR-13 established itself in the mostly Ladino departments of Izabal and Zacapa. The FGEI established itself in Sierra de las Minas, and the PGT operated as an urban guerrillas front. Each of these three “frentes” (comprising no more than 500 combatants) was led by former members of the 1960 army revolt who has been trained in counterinsurgency warfare by the United States.
As well as fighting between government forces and rebel groups, the conflict included a large-scale, coordinated campaign of one-sided violence by the Guatemalan state against the civilian population from the mid-1960s onward. The military intelligence services (G2 or S2) and an affiliated intelligence organization were responsible for coordinating killings and “disappearances” of opponents of the state, suspected insurgents, and those deemed by the intelligence services to be collaborators. The afilliated intelligence organization was known as La Regional or Archivo and was headquartered in an annex of the presidential palace.
The Guatemalan state was the first in Latin America to engage in widespread use of forced disappearances against its opposition, with the number of disappeared estimated at between 40,000 and 50,000 from 1966 until the end of the war. In rural areas where the insurgency maintained its strongholds, the repression amounted to wholesale slaughter of the peasantry and massacres of entire villages, starting in Izabal and Zacapa (1966 – 68) and later in the predominantly Mayan western highlands. In the early 1980s, the killings reached the scale of genocide.
Domination by Military Rulers
In 1970, Colonel Carlos Manuel Arana Osorio became the first of a series of military dictators representing the Institutional Democratic Party, or PID. The PID dominated Guatemalan politics for 12 years via electoral fraud favoring two of Arana’s proteges: General Kjell Eugenio Laugerud Garcia in 1974 and General Romeo Lucas Garcia in 1978. Also during the 1970s, continuing social discontent gave rise to an insurgency among large populations of indigenous people and peasants, who traditionally bore the brunt of unequal land tenure. The PID lost its grip on Guatemalan politics when General Efraín Ríos Montt, together with a group of junior army officers, seized power in a military coup on March 23, 1982.
During the 1980s, the Guatemalan military assumed almost absolute government power for five years. It successfully infiltrated and eliminated enemies in every socio-political institution of the nation, including the political, social, and intellectual classes. In the final stage of the civil war, the military developed a parallel, semi-visible, low profile, but high-effect, control of Guatemala’s national life.
Mejia Victores Regime and Democratic Transition
Ríos Montt was deposed on August 8, 1983, by his own Minister of Defense, General Óscar Humberto Mejía Victores. Mejía Victores became de facto president and justified the coup by characterizing Montt’s regime as corrupt and its officials as abusing their positions of power within the government. Montt remained in politics and founded the Guatemalan Republican Front party in 1989. He was elected President of Congress in 1995 and 2000. By the time Mejia Victores assumed power, the counterinsurgency under Lucas Garcia and Montt had largely succeeded in its objective of detaching the insurgency from its civilian support base. Additionally, G2 had infiltrated most political institutions, eradicating opponents in the government through terror and selective assassinations. The counterinsurgency program had militarized Guatemalan society, creating a fearful atmosphere that suppressed most public agitation and insurgency. The military had consolidated its power in virtually all sectors of society.
Due to international pressure, as well as pressure from other Latin American nations, Mejía Victores allowed a gradual return to democracy in Guatemala. On July 1, 1984, an election was held for representatives to a Constituent Assembly to draft a democratic constitution. On May 30, 1985, the Constituent Assembly finished drafting a new constitution, which took effect immediately. General elections were scheduled and civilian candidate Vinicio Cerezo was elected as president. The gradual revival of democracy did not end the disappearances and death squad killings, however, as extrajudicial state violence had become an integral part of the political culture.
The Democratic Era: Cerezo Administration
Vinicio Cerezo, a civilian politician and the presidential candidate of the Guatemalan Christian Democracy, won the first election held under the new constitution with almost 70% of the vote. Upon its inauguration in January 1986, President Cerezo’s civilian government announced that its top priorities would be to end the political violence and establish rule of law. Reforms included new laws of habeas corpus and amparo (court-ordered protection), the creation of a legislative human rights committee, and the establishment in 1987 of the Office of Human Rights Ombudsman. The Supreme Court also embarked on a series of reforms to fight corruption and improve legal system efficiency.
With Cerezo’s election, the military moved away from governing and returned to the more traditional role of providing internal security, specifically by fighting armed insurgents. The first two years of Cerezo’s administration were characterized by a stable economy and a marked decrease in political violence. Dissatisfied military personnel made coup attempts in May 1988 and May 1989, but military leadership supported the constitutional order. However, the government was heavily criticized for its unwillingness to investigate or prosecute cases of human rights violations.
Presidential and congressional elections were held on November 11, 1990. After the second-round ballot, Jorge Antonio Serrano Elías was inaugurated on January 14, 1991, completing the first transition from one democratically elected civilian government to another. Because his Movement of Solidarity Action (MAS) Party gained only 18 of 116 seats in Congress, Serrano entered into a tenuous alliance with the Christian Democrats and the National Union of the Center (UCN).
Serrano Administration
The Serrano administration’s record was mixed. It had some success in consolidating civilian control over the army, replacing a number of senior officers and persuading the military to participate in peace talks with the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity, or URNG, an umbrella organization representing leftist beliefs among the Guatemalan people, particularly the poor. He took the politically unpopular step of recognizing the sovereignty of Belize, which until then was officially though fruitlessly claimed by Guatemala. The Serrano government reversed the economic slump it inherited, reducing inflation and creating real growth.
Then on May 25, 1993, Serrano illegally dissolved Congress and the Supreme Court and attempted to restrict civil freedoms, allegedly in order to fight corruption. The auto-coup failed due to the unified efforts of most elements of Guatemalan society to protest Serrano’s actions, international pressure, and the army’s enforcement of the decisions of the Court of Constitutionality, which ruled against the attempted takeover. Subsequently, Serrano fled the country and pursuant to the provisions of the 1985 constitution, the Guatemalan Congress elected the Human Rights Ombudsman, Alfonso Guillermo de León Marroquín, to complete Serrano’s presidential term as of June 5, 1993.
De León was not a member of any political party and lacked a political base. Nonetheless, he enjoyed strong popular support. During his time in office, he launched an ambitious anti-corruption campaign within Congress and the Supreme Court, demanding the resignations of all members of the two bodies.
Renewed Peace Process, 1994-1996
Under de León, the peace process, now brokered by the United Nations, took on new life. The government and the URNG signed agreements on human rights (March 1994), resettlement of displaced persons (June 1994), historical clarification (June 1994), and indigenous rights (March 1995). They also made significant progress on a socioeconomic and agrarian agreement.
National elections for president, Congress, and municipal offices were held in November 1995. With almost 20 parties competing in the first round, the presidential election came down to a January 7, 1996, run-off in which National Advancement Party (PAN) candidate Álvaro Arzú Irigoyen defeated Alfonso Portillo Cabrera of the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG) by just over two percent of the vote. Arzú won because of his strength in Guatemala City, where he previously served as mayor, and in the surrounding urban area. Portillo won all of the rural departments except Petén.
Under the Arzú administration, peace negotiations were concluded, and the government and URNG, which became a legal party, signed peace accords ending the 36-year internal conflict in December 1996. The General Secretary of the URNG, Comandante Rolando Morán, and President Álvaro Arzú jointly received the UNESCO Peace Prize for their efforts to end the civil war and attain the peace agreement. The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1094 on January 20, 1997, deploying military observers to Guatemala to monitor the implementation of the peace agreements.
Legal Charges of Crimes Against Humanity
In total, an estimated 200,000 civilians were killed or “disappeared” during the conflict, most at the hands of the military, police, and intelligence services. Victims of the repression included indigenous activists, suspected government opponents, returning refugees, critical academics, students, left-leaning politicians, trade unionists, religious workers, journalists, and street children. The “Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico” has estimated that 93% of the violence committed during the conflict was carried out by government forces and 3% by guerrillas.
In 2009, Guatemalan courts sentenced the first person to be convicted of the crime of ordering forced disappearances: Felipe Cusanero. This was followed by the 2013 trial of former president Montt for the killing and disappearances of more than 1,700 indigenous Ixil Maya during his 1982-83 rule. The accusations of genocide derived from the “Memoria del Silencio” report written by the UN-appointed Commission for Historical Clarification, which held that genocide could have occurred in Quiché between 1981 and 1983.
Montt was the first former head of state to be tried for genocide by his own country’s judicial system; he was found guilty the day following the conclusion of his trial and sentenced to 80 years in prison. A few days later, however, the sentence was reversed, and the trial was rescheduled due to alleged judicial anomalies. The trial began again in 2015. The court decided, due to his alleged senility, that a closed-door trial would resume in January 2016, and that if Montt were found guilty, a jail sentence would be precluded given his health condition.
From the Somozas to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua
In the 20th century, Nicaragua transitioned from an oligarchic dictatorship to the revolutionary government of a democratic socialist political party.
Learning Objectives
- Evaluate the Nicaraguan Civil War on the United States foreign policy.
Key Terms / Key Concepts
ceasefire: a temporary stoppage of war in which each side agrees with the other to suspend aggressive actions
guerrilla: a participant in an irregular form of warfare in which small groups engage in military tactics including ambushes, sabotage, raids, petty warfare, hit-and-run tactics, and mobility to fight a larger and less mobile traditional military
Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN): now a democratic socialist political party, but previously a Nicaraguan resistance organization opposed to the hereditary Somoza dictatorship
Somoza Dynasty, 1927-1979
Over the course of its history, Nicaragua has experienced several military dictatorships; the longest was the hereditary dictatorship of the Somoza family, who ruled for 43 years during the 20th century. The Somoza family came to power as part of a U.S.-engineered pact in 1927 that stipulated the formation of the Guardia Nacional (National Guard) to replace the marines who had long reigned in Nicaragua. Anastasio Somoza slowly eliminated officers in the National Guard who might have stood in his way, then deposed President Juan Bautista Sacasa to become Nicaragua’s new president on January 1, 1937, in a rigged election.
When Anastasio was shot and mortally wounded by Liberal Nicaraguan poet Rigoberto Lopez Perez on September 21, 1956, his eldest son, Luis Somoza Debayle, was appointed president by Congress and officially took charge of the country. He is remembered as moderate, but he was only in power for a few years before dying of a heart attack. His successor as president was Rene Schick Gutierrez, widely considered a puppet of the Somoza family.
The Somoza family was among a few families or groups of influential firms that reaped most of the benefits of the country’s growth from the 1950s to the 1970s. When Anastasio Somoza Debayle was deposed by the Sandinistas in 1979, the family’s worth was estimated between U.S. $500 million and $1.5 billion. In 1972 when an earthquake destroyed nearly 90% of Managua, Anastasio Somoza Debayle siphoned off relief money instead of helping to rebuild the city. Even the economic elite were reluctant to support Somoza following his actions, as he had acquired monopolies in industries that were key to rebuilding the nation.
Nicaraguan Revolution, 1960s-1990
In 1961, Carlos Fonseca, along with two others, founded the Sadinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), which was a return to the influence of the historical figure of Augusto Cesar Sandino—the charismatic leader of Nicaragua’s nationalist rebellion against the U.S. occupation of the country. The December 1972 Managua earthquake was a major turning point in the revival of the Sandinistas, stoking violent opposition to the government during a time of heightened international attention. The Sandinistas even received some support from Cuba and the Soviet Union during this period.
On December 27, 1974, a group of nine FSLN guerrillas invaded a party at the home of a former Minister of Agriculture, killing him and three guards in the process of taking hostage several leading government officials and prominent businessmen. In return for the hostages, they succeeded in getting the government to pay $2 million US ransom. Additionally, they effected the broadcast of an FSLN declaration on the radio and in the opposition newspaper La Prensa, the release of 14 FSLN members from jail, as well as flights to Cuba for the raiders and the released FSLN members. The incident humiliated the government and greatly enhanced the prestige of the FSLN. Anastasio Somoza Debayle, in his memoirs, refers to this action as the beginning of a sharp escalation in terms of Sandinista attacks and government reprisals.
Martial law was declared in 1975, and the National Guard began to raze villages in the jungle suspected of supporting the rebels. Human rights groups condemned the actions, but U.S. President Gerald Ford refused to break the alliance with Somoza.
The country tipped into full-scale civil war with the 1978 murder of Pedro Chamorro—a Nicaraguan journalist and publisher who opposed violence against the regime. Fifty thousand people turned out for his funeral. Many assumed that Somoza ordered his assassination because there was evidence implicating Somoza’s son and other members of the National Guard. A nationwide strike commenced in protest, demanding an end to the dictatorship. At the same time, the Sandinistas stepped up their rate of guerrillas activity. Several towns, assisted by Sandinista guerrillas, expelled their National Guard units. Somoza responded with increasing violence and repression. When León became the first city in Nicaragua to fall to the Sandinistas, he responded with aerial bombardment.
The U.S. media grew increasingly unfavorable in its reporting on the situation in Nicaragua. Realizing that the Somoza dictatorship was unsustainable, the Carter administration attempted to force him to leave Nicaragua. Somoza refused and sought to maintain his power through the National Guard. At that point, the U.S. ambassador sent a cable to the White House saying it would be “ill-advised” to call off the bombing, because such an action would help the Sandinistas gain power. When ABC reporter Bill Stewart was executed by the National Guard and graphic film of the killing was broadcast on TV, the American public became more hostile to Somoza. In the end, President Carter refused Somoza further military aid, believing that the repressive nature of the government led to popular support for the Sandinista uprising.
Beginning of the Sandinista Period
In May 1979, another general strike was called, and the FSLN launched a major push to take control of the country. By mid-July, they had Somoza and the National Guard isolated in Managua. As Nicaragua’s government collapsed and the National Guard commanders escaped with Somoza, the rebels advanced on the capital victoriously.
On July 19, 1979, a new government was proclaimed under a provisional junta headed by 33-year-old Daniel Ortega. The FSLN took over a nation plagued by malnutrition, disease, and pesticide contamination. Lake Managua was considered dead because of decades of pesticide runoff, toxic chemical pollution from lakeside factories, and untreated sewage. Additionally, soil erosion and dust storms were also a problem in Nicaragua due to deforestation. To tackle these crises, the FSLN created the Nicaraguan Institute of Natural Resources and the Environment.
The Sandinistas were victorious in the national election of November 4, 1984, gathering 67% of the vote. The election was certified “free and fair” by the majority of international observers, although the Nicaraguan political opposition and the Reagan administration claimed political restrictions were placed on the opposition by the government. The primary opposition candidate was the U.S.-backed Arturo Cruz, who succumbed to pressure from the United States government not to take part in the 1984 elections. Other opposition parties, such as the Conservative Democratic Party and the Independent Liberal Party, were free to denounce the Sandinista government and participate in the elections. Later, historians such as Christopher Andrews did find evidence that the FSLN was actively suppressing right-wing opposition parties while leaving moderate parties alone.
Communist Leanings and U.S. Contras
American support for the Somoza family soured diplomatic relations with Nicaragua. The FSLN government was committed to a Marxist ideology, with many leading Sandinista individuals continuing long-standing relationships with the Soviet Union and Cuba. U.S. President Carter initially hoped that continued American aid to the new government would keep the Sandinistas from forming a Marxist-Leninist government aligned with the Soviet bloc, but the Carter administration allotted the Sandinistas minimal funding, and the Sandinistas resolutely turned away from the United States, investing Cuban and East European assistance into a new army of 75,000. The buildup included T-55 heavy tanks, heavy artillery, and HIND attack helicopters; this was an unprecedented military buildup that made the Sandinista Army more powerful than all of its neighbors combined.
The first challenge to the powerful new army came from the Contras—groups of Somoza’s National Guard that had fled to Honduras and were organized, trained, and funded by CIA elements involved in cocaine trafficking in Central America. The Contra chain of command included some ex-National Guardsmen, including Contra founder and commander Enrique Bermúdez. One prominent Contra commander, however, was ex-Sandinista hero Edén Pastora, aka “Commadante Zero,” who rejected the Leninist orientation of his fellow commandantes.
The Contras operated out of camps in neighboring Honduras to the north and Costa Rica to the south. They engaged in a systematic campaign of terror among the rural Nicaraguan population in order to disrupt the social reform projects of the Sandinistas. The Contra campaign and supporting Reagan administration came under criticism for the brutality and numerous human rights violations related to these operations, including the destruction of health centers, schools, and cooperatives at the hands of the rebels.
With the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980, relations between the United States and the Sandinista regime became an active front in the Cold War. The Reagan administration insisted that the Sandinistas posed a Communist threat, reacting particularly to the support provided to them by Cuban president Fidel Castro, as well as the Sandinistas’ close military relations with the Soviets and Cubans. Opposition to the Sandanistas also furthered the Reagan administration’s desire to protect U.S. interests in the region, which were threatened by the policies of the Sandinista government.
The U.S. quickly suspended aid to Nicaragua and expanded the supply of arms and training to the Contra rebels in neighboring Honduras, as well as allied groups based in Costa Rica. American pressure against the Nicaraguan government escalated throughout 1983 and 1984. Meanwhile, the Contras began a campaign of economic sabotage and disrupted shipping by planting underwater mines in Nicaragua’s Port of Corinto, an action condemned by the International Court of Justice as illegal. The UN General Assembly also passed a resolution in order to pressure the U.S. to pay the fine. The U.S. refused to pay restitution and claimed that the ICJ was not competent to judge the case.
On May 1, 1985, Reagan issued an executive order that imposed a full economic embargo on Nicaragua, which remained in force until March 1990. However, in 1982, legislation was enacted by the U.S. Congress to prohibit further direct aid to the Contras. Reagan’s officials attempted to illegally supply them out of the proceeds of arms sales to Iran and third-party donations, triggering the Iran-Contra Affair of 1986 – 87.
Mutual exhaustion, Sandinista fears of Contra unity and military success, and mediation by other regional governments led to the Sapoa ceasefire between the Sandinistas and the Contras on March 23, 1988. Subsequent agreements were designed to reintegrate the Contras and their supporters into Nicaraguan society in preparation for general elections.
Colombia and the FARC
FARC’s guerrilla movement against the Colombian government, an active conflict since 1964, has been fraught with violence, human rights abuses, and numerous attempts to broker a lasting peace. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia—People’s Army (FARC) is a guerrilla movement involved in the continuing Colombian armed conflict since 1964. It employs a variety of military tactics in addition to more unconventional methods, including terrorism. The FARC-EP, formed during the Cold War as a Marxist-Leninist peasant force, promotes a political line of agrarianism and anti-imperialism. The operations of the FARC-EP were funded by kidnap and ransom, illegal mining, extortion or taxation of various forms of economic activity, and the taxation, production, and distribution of illegal drugs. The United Nations has estimated that 12% of all killings of civilians in the Colombian conflict have been committed by FARC and ELN guerrillas, with 80% committed by right-wing paramilitaries, and the remaining eight percent committed by security forces.
Learning Objectives
- Evaluate the civil war in Colombia.
History of the Conflict
Communists were active throughout rural and urban Colombia immediately following World War I. The Colombian Communist Party (PCC) began establishing “peasant leagues” in rural areas and “popular fronts” in urban areas, calling for improved living and working conditions, education, and rights for the working class. However, many of the PCC’s attempts at organizing peasants were met with violent repression by the Colombian government and the landowning class. These groups began networking together to present a defensive front against the state-supported violence of large landholders. Members organized strikes, protests, and land seizures, and organized communist-controlled “self-defense communities” in southern Colombia that were able to resist state military forces while providing for the subsistence needs of the populace.
In 1961, a guerrilla leader and long-time PCC organizer named Manuel Marulanda Vélez declared an independent “Republic of Marquetalia.” The Lleras government attempted unsuccessfully to drive out the guerrillas, due to fear that a revolution similar to that of Cuba’s may develop. Several army outposts were set up in the area and the Colombian government began routinely attacking communist groups, hoping to reassimilate territories under the influence of communists. In 1964, Manuel Marulanda Vélez and other PCC members formed FARC. Sixteen thousand Colombian troops attacked the community, which only had 48 armed fighters. Marulanda and 47 others fought against government forces at Marquetalia and then escaped into the mountains along with other fighters. These 48 men formed the core of FARC, which later grew in size to hundreds of fighters.
Initially, FARC rejected any involvement in the emerging phenomenon of drug growing and trafficking, but during the 1980s the group gradually came to accept it as it became a burgeoning business. Taxes on drug producers and traffickers were introduced as a source of funding and increased income from the “coca boom” allowed them to expand into an irregular army able to stage large-scale attacks on Colombian troops. This in part led to the Seventh Guerrilla Conference held by FARC in 1982, which called for a major shift in FARC’s strategy.
FARC had historically been doing most of its fighting in rural areas and was limited to small-scale confrontations with Colombian military forces. FARC began sending fighters to Vietnam and the Soviet Union for advanced military training. They also planned to move closer to middle-sized cities, as opposed to only remote rural areas, as well as closer to areas rich in natural resources to create a strong economic infrastructure. It was also at this conference that FARC added the initials “EP”, for “Ejército del Pueblo” or “People’s Army”, to the organization’s name.
Uribe Agreement and the Union Patriótica
Also in the early 1980s, President Belisario Betancur began discussing the possibility of peace talks with the guerrillas. This led to the 1984 La Uribe Agreement, which called for a ceasefire that lasted from 1984 until 1987. In 1985, members of the FARC-EP, along with a large number of other leftist and communist groups, formed a political party known as the Union Patriótica (“Patriotic Union”, UP). The UP sought constitutional reform, more democratic local elections, political decentralization, and the end of the two-party system dominated by Liberal and Conservative parties. They also pursued socioeconomic reforms such land redistribution, greater health and education spending, the nationalization of foreign businesses, Colombian banks, transportation, and greater public access to mass media.
While many members of the UP were involved with the FARC-EP, the large majority of them were not and came from a wide variety of backgrounds such as labor unions and socialist parties. In the cities, the FARC-EP began integrating itself with the UP and forming Juntas Patrióticas (or “solidarity cells”)—small groups of people associated with labor unions, student activist groups, and peasant leagues, who traveled into the barrios discussing social problems, building support for the UP, and determining the sociopolitical stance of the urban peasantry. The UP performed better in elections than any leftist party in Colombia’s history. In 1986, UP candidates won 350 local council seats, 23 deputy positions in departmental assemblies, nine seats in the House, and six seats in the Senate. The 1986 Presidential candidate, Jaime Pardo Leal, won 4.6% of the national vote.
During the ceasefire, the Colombian government continued its negotiations with the FARC-EP and other armed groups, some of which were successful. Some groups that demobilized during this period include the EPL, the ERP, the Quintin Lame Armed Movement, and the M-19. Towards the end of 1990, however, the army, with no advance warning and while negotiations were still ongoing, attacked a compound known as Casa Verde, which houses the National Secretariat of the FARC-EP. The Colombian government argued that the attack was caused by the FARC-EP’s lack of commitment to the peace process.
Peace Negotiations
On June 3, 1991, dialogue resumed between the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Board and the government. The conflict did not halt, however, and armed attacks by both sides continued. The renewed negotiations were broken off in 1993 when no agreement could be reached.
A letter written by a group of Colombian intellectuals, including Gabriel Garcia Marquez, to the Coordinating Board was published denouncing the approach taken by the FARC-EP and the dire consequences it was having on the country. The Coordinating Board disappeared not long afterwards, and the guerrilla groups continued their activities independently.
Renewed negotiations began on November 7, 1998, under President Andres Pastrana, who granted FARC-EP a 42,000-square-kilometer (16,200-square-mile) safe haven as a confidence-building measure. Unfortunately, the peace talks ended on February 21, 2002, due to a series of high-profile guerrilla actions, including the hijacking of an aircraft, sieges on a number of small towns and cities, several political kidnappings, and the arrest of the Irish Colombia Three—a group of Irish Republican Army members who allegedly were training FARC-EP militants to make bombs. Afterwards, Pastrana ordered the armed forces to start retaking the FARC-EP controlled zone.
The Uribe and Santos Administrations
For most of the period between 2002 and 2005, the FARC-EP was believed to be in strategic withdrawal due to the increasing military and police actions of President Alvaro Uribe; this led to the capture or desertion of many fighters and medium-level commanders. Uribe ran for office on an anti-FARC-EP platform and was determined to defeat the guerrillas in a bid to restore confidence in the country. Uribe’s own father was killed by FARC-EP in an attempted kidnapping in 1983. Nonetheless, FARC interventions and violence continued throughout Uribe’s administration and well into that of his successor: Juan Manuel Santos.
Military offensives carried out under former President Uribe and President Santos have significantly reduced the number of FARC combatants and the amount of FARC territorial control; this has pushed guerrillas to more remote and sparsely populated regions, often close to territorial or internal borders.
On June 23, 2016, a ceasefire accord was signed between the FARC-EP and Colombian government. Under the accord, the Colombian government agreed to support massive investment for rural development and facilitate the FARC’s reincarnation as a political party. FARC promised to help to eradicate illegal drug crops, remove landmines in areas of conflict, and offer reparations to victims. FARC leaders can avoid prosecution by acts of reparation to victims and other community work. However, during a referendum held October 2, 2016, Colombians voted to reject the peace deal with FARC by 50.2% to 49.8%.
The government met with victims and peace opponents after the referendum was rejected, receiving over 500 proposed changes, and continued to negotiate with FARC.
A revised agreement was announced on November 12, 2016, which would require parliamentary approval rather than a nationwide referendum. Among the reported 60 new or modified t erms was a provision for FARC assets to be distributed for victim compensation. FARC members would be able to establish a political party and be granted full immunity for full confession and cooperation, although drug trafficking would be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Peace terms would be enforced by a Special Justice for the Peace, who would report to the Constitutional Court and not to an international body. Additionally, both Parliament and the Special Justice would have the ability to modify terms of the agreement as seen necessary. The Colombian government and FARC signed the revised peace deal on November 24, 2016, and Congress approved it on November 30, 2016.
Primary Source: What is Peronísm? 1948
Juan Domingo Perón is among the most contentious figures in the modern political history of South America. On the one hand, many commentators are prepared to argue that he was a fascist, but others see in Perónism, which long retained the support of the Argentine working class, real elements of a social justice movement combined with severely compromised leadership.
Perón, an army officer, siezed power in 1944 with a group of other officers. During the Argentine presidential election of 1946, Perón claimed to be a democrat who would accept any outcome. And it seems that, with the support of his hugely popular wife Eva Duarte de Perón (Evita)[1919-1952], he won that election quite fairly. His government was a sort of populist dictatorship, characterized by genuine efforts to raise the living standards of the urban poor, but also quite dramatic levels of petty corruption. He was initially support by the army, nationalists, and the Catholic heirarchy as well as the trade union support secured by Evita.
After Evita's death in 1952, and the severe economic problems which followed the failure of his nationalist economic measures, he was overthrown by a coup in 1955, and sent into exile. After 18 years of military rule, he was allowed to return in 1971, and won the presidential election of 1973. He was succeeded in office in 1974 by his third wife Isabel Martínez de Perón (Eva had been number two), who was herself displaced by a military coup in 1976. That period of military rule ended in 1982, and by 1989 yet another Perónist government came to power - headed by Carlos Saúl Menem. As of 1998 Argentina is still governed by the Perónist Party, although it must be noted that Menem's policies are very different than Perón's.
What is Perónism?
Speech of 20 August, 1948
In Congress a few days ago, some of our legislators have asked what Perónismis. Perónism is humanism in action; Perónism is a new political doctrine, which rejects all the ills of the politics of previous times; in the social sphere it is a theory which establishes a little equal ity among men, which grants them similar opportunities and assures them of a future so that in this land there may be no one who lacks what he needs for a living, even though it may be necessary that those who are wildly squandering what they possess may be deprived of the right to do so, for the benefit of those who have nothing at all; in the economic sphere its aim is that every Argentine should pull his weight for the Argentines and that economic policy which maintained that this was a permanent and perfect school of capitalist exploitation should be replaced by a doctrine of social economy under which the distribution of our wealth, which we force the earth to yield up to us and which furthermore we are elab orating, may be shared out fairly among all those who have contributed by their efforts to amass it.
That is Perónism. And Perónism is not learned, nor just talked about: one feels it or else disagrees. Perónism is a question of the heart rather than of the head. Fortunately I am not one of those Presidents who live a life apart, but on the contrary I live among my people, just as I have always lived; so that I share all the ups and downs, all their successes an all their disappointments with my working class people. I feel an intimate satisfaction when I see a workman who is well dressed or taking his family to the theatre. I feel just as satisfied as I would feel if I were that workman myself. That is Perónism.
One Single Class of Men
I have never been of the opinion that in this world there should be groups of men against other groups, nations against nations and much less can I admit that men should be enemies because they profess a different religion. How could it be admitted, how could it be explained that anti-Semitism should exist in Argentina? In Argentina there should not be more than one single class of men: men who work together for the welfare of the nation, without any discrimination whatever. They are good Argentines, no matter what their origin, their race or their religion may be, if they work every day for the greatness of the Nation, and they are bad Argentines, no matter what they say or how much they shout, if they are not laying a new stone every day towards the construction of the building of the happiness and grandeur of our Nation.
That is the only discrimination which Argentina should make among its inhabitants: those who are doing constructive work and those who are not; those who are benefactors to the country and those who are not. For this reason in this freest land of the free, as long as I am President of the Republic, no one will be persecuted by anyone else.
The Twenty Truths of the Perónist JusticialismFrom a speech of 17th October 1950 made at the Plaza de Mayo.
1., True democracy is the system where the Government carries out the will of the people defending a single objective: the interests of the people.
2. Perónism is an eminently popular movement. Every political clique is opposed to the popular interests and, therefore, it cannot be a Perónist organization.
3. A Perónist must be at the service of the cause. He who invoking the name of this cause is really at the service of a political clique or a "caudillo" (local political leader) is only a Perónist by name.
4. There is only one class of men for the Perónist cause: the workers.
5. In the New Argentina, work is a right which dignifies man and a duty, because it is only fair that each one should produce at least what he consumes.
6. There can be nothing better for a Perónist than another Perónist.
7. No Perónist should presume to be more than he really is, nor should he adopt a position inferior to what his social status should be. When a Perónist starts to think that he is more important than he really is, he is about to become one of the oligarchy.
8. With reference to political action the scale of values for all Perónists is as follows: First, the Homeland; afterwards the cause, and then, the men themselves.
9. Politics do not constitute for us a definite objective but only a means of achieving the Homeland's welfare represented by the happiness of the people and the greatness of the nation.
10. The two main branches of Perónism are the Social Justice and the Social Welfare. With these we envelop the people in an embrace of justice and love.
11. Perónism desires the establishment of national unity and the abolition of civil strife. It welcomes heroes but does not want martyrs.
12. In the New Argentina the only privileged ones are the children.
13. A Government without a doctrine is a body without a soul. That is why Perónism has established its own political, economic and social doctrines: Justicialism.
14. Justicialism is a new philosophical school of life. It is simple, practical, popular and endowed with deeply Christian and humanitarian sentiments.
15. As a political doctrine, Justicialism establishes a fair balance between the rights of the individual and those of the community.
16. As an economic doctrine, Justicialism achieves a true form of social economy by placing capital at the service of the national economy and this at the service of social welfare.
17. As a social doctrine, Justicialism presides over an adequate distribution of Social Justice giving to each person the social rights he is entitled to.
18. We want a socially just, an economically free and a politically independent Argentina.
19. We are an organized State and a free people ruled by a centralized government.
20. The best of this land of ours is its people
.Juan Perón
October 17, 1950, Year of the Liberator General San Martin
Source:
from Juan Domingo Perón, Perónist Doctrine. Edited by the Perónist Party. (Buenos Aires, 1952)
Attributions
Source image provided by Wikimedia Commons: Che and Castro
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A2%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%83%D0%BC%D1%84_%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%BB%D1%8E%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%B8#/media/%D0%A4%D0%B0%D0%B9%D0%BB:CheyFidel.jpg
Chapters adapted from:
https://www.coursehero.com/study-guides/boundless-worldhistory/argentina/
https://www.coursehero.com/study-guides/boundless-worldhistory/chile/
https://www.coursehero.com/study-guides/boundless-worldhistory/brazil/
https://www.coursehero.com/study-guides/boundless-worldhistory/conflict-across-latin-america/
https://www.coursehero.com/study-guides/boundless-worldhistory/crisis-points-of-the-cold-war/